the antivivisection programmes, the brain death episode and the side effects of whooping cough vaccination. In many cases the text was not too biased but, as Dr Ian Munro (Lancet) pointed out, it was the headline which caused the maximum damage. Mr Bedford admitted that it was virtually impossible to control last-minute changes of headlines by subeditors. One participant considered that good behaviour was probably not consistent with a free press, but Dr Andrew Herxheimer (Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin) suggested that two prizes might be given each year, a bouquet for the best example of medical reporting and a wooden spoon for the worst!
In summing up the Chairman referred to a recent meeting in Salzburg on a similar subject, when a scientific expert had quoted, 'I fear what 1 do not understand'. The lay public feared medicine because the balance of risk to benefit was never adequately explained, and the medical fraternity feared the media and did not understand its diffuse organization. There was no likelihood of improvement without major effort. Nevertheless, recognition .of the need for improvement to prevent misrepresentation and to avoid repeated Even before the first meeting of the Oversight Committee, NIOSH wrote a report which found crises demanded some positive action by all medical bodies, including the Conference of Presidents of the Royal Colleges, the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry and even the DHSS. The action most likely to produce benefit appeared to be a well publicized and constantly available panel of speakers, possibly based on the BMA regional and. central information service, and aiming at regular dialogue with the media. It was therefore agreed that the Forum should seek early contact with the Health Education Council and also draw up a report for consideration by the Conference of College Presidents. no hazards at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNS). After Dr Bross pointed out the shortcomings of this study, the report was hastily withdrawn. The cohort follow-up study described in the letter from Rinsky & Landrigan was set up in its place.
Letters to the Editor

Data on lung cancer in radiation workers
D M BURLEY
Vice-Chairman
In mid-1980, NIOSH sent the Oversight Committee a first draft of its cohort study (Rinsky et al. 1980 ) which was heavily criticized by Dr Bross and other members. Nevertheless, without the knowledge of the Oversight Committee, NIOSH proceeded to publish a version of this report in The Lancet of 31 January 1981 which concluded that: 'Finally, in PNS radiation workers we found no positive dosage response relationship between ionizing radiation dose and mortality for any cause reported' (Rinsky et al. 1981) .
As came to light at a belated meeting of the Oversight Committee on 17 March 1981, this 'conclusion' had been reached before CDC/NIOSH had carried out a single statistical analysis of the dosage-response relationship for any cause of death. Indeed, the consultants had not even seen the dosage-response data for any causes other than leukaemia and related diseases. These dosage-response data were subsequently obtained by the threat of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.
No competent biostatistician or epidemiologist who was analysing this PNS data would have 'countless thousands of permutations available to them'. Lung cancer and leukaemia are among the few radiogenic causes of death that are named in the 1981 Lancet paper. It is well known that there is a IS-year latent period for lung cancer before increased risks are detectable. Finally, lung cancer is one of the few radiogenic causes of death in the PNS data where (after a IS-year latent period) the series size is sufficiently large to have much chance of detecting a radiogenic effect. So it is hardly surprising that the first table that Bross & Driscoll (1981) analysed was the dose-latency table for lung cancer.
The point, of course, is that if NIOSH had taken the trouble to do valid statistical dosageresponse analyses (taking account of latent period) for the PNS causes of death, they could hardly have missed the relationship for lung cancer, and they could not have published the misleading report in The Lancet. Indeed, when they later carried out the analyses, they found some other interesting cause-of-death relationships (that have never been reported).
Moreover, NIOSH has just completed (December 1982) a draft report on the casecontrol study which was carried out to confirm or deny our lung cancer findings. Not only does this new study confirm our findings (Bross & Driscoll 1981), as well as the original report of excess cancer at PNS that Najarian & Colton published in 1978, but it also contains a major new scientific finding. What we find is a strong synergism with chemicals (asbestos, etc.) at levels of radiation that are considered to be very low. Thus the synergism occurs with lifetime badge dose exposures that are generally less than the S rem which is permitted annually by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Unfortunately, once again through inadequate statistical analysis, NIOSH has in their latest draft report again reached a negative conclusion on strongly positive data.
British readers should realize that NIOSH reports and those of other US agencies in the interagency task force on low-level radiation hazards should be read as policy statements and not as scientific papers. Sincerely 
